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VIETNAM'S ANTITRUST
LEGISLATION AND
SUBSCRIPTION TO E-ASEAN:
AN END TO THE BAMBOO FIREWALL

OVER INTERNET REGULATION?
I.

INTRODUCTION

On June 11, 2001, Vietnam experienced an unprecedented level of
telecommunication congestion, resulting in a virtual stoppage to both Internet and mobile phone services. The severity of the problem peaked
when Vietnam's only state-approved Internet Access Provider ("LAP"),'
Vietnam Data Communications ("VDC"), was forced to close down its
gateway until adequate services could be put in place to remedy the on2
line Internet and telecommunication debacle.
Since the early 1990s, similar incidents have not been uncommon
among Internet users in Vietnam. Slow surfing, feeble bandwidth, and
abhorrent telecom fees have plagued the approximately 130,000 Internet
subscribers in the country. 3 Many technocrats in Vietnam trace the
source of such problems to government policy driven by security con1. An AP is:
a company that provides access to the Internet. IAPs generally provide dial-up
access through a modem and PPP connection, though companies that offer Internet access with other devices, such as cable modems or wireless connections,
could also be considered IAPs. The terms IAPs and ISP (Internet Service Providers) are often used interchangeably, though some people consider IAPs to be a
subset of ISPs. Whereas IAPs offer only Internet access, ISPs may provide additional services, such as leased lines (T-1 or T-3) and Web development. In contrast
to both lAPs and ISPs, online services provide their own proprietary content in
addition to Internet access.
Webopedia.com, IAP <http://www.pcwebopedia.comfrERM/I/ILAP.html> (accessed Jan. 10,
2003).
2. Tu Giang, Breakdown Throws Spotlight on Lack of Internet Access, Vietnam Inv.
Rev. (June 11, 2001) (available in 2001 WL 12429720).
3. Margot Cohen, Information Technology: Callingfor Change, Far E. Econ. Rev. 45,
1, 3 (Sept. 21, 2000) (available in 2000 WL-FEER 23079751). The 130,000 Internet subscribers comprise less than one percent of the total population of Vietnam. However, current statistics on users have approximately doubled in the past three years. See also Tu
Hoang, Sharp Rise in Internet Subscriptions Forecast,Vietnam Inv. Rev. 1 (June 4, 2001)
(available in 2001 WL 12429689).
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cerns. 4 One such example are the policy directives imposed by the Directorate General of Post and Telecommunications 5 ("DGTP"), Vietnam' s
state monopoly that regulates the gateway allowing Vietnam access to
the World Wide Web. The most apparent form of regulation by Vietnam's
6
DGPT has been its interception and control of Internet communications
7
by using what computer system engineers refer to as a "firewall."
Specifically, the government is struggling to achieve a system in
which they can regulate Internet usage so as to satisfy their security
concerns while simultaneously meeting the increased demand for domestic services. Many scholars have discussed approaches by other countries to regulate the Internet.8 Although significant focus has been
placed on China's efforts 9 to mandate Internet regulation, little if any
assessment has been made of Vietnam's current technological struggle.
Divided into four main parts, this Comment will attempt to provide some
analysis in regards to Vietnam's regulatory response to Internet
technology.
Part II of this Comment provides a historical overview of Vietnam's
management and regulatory policy over the Internet. Part III examines
4. Giang, supra n. 2 at I8, 10.
5. Until 1993 DGPT was the only telecommunications organization in Vietnam. In
July 2001, the company commenced a major restructure to separate its post and telecommunications divisions. The DGPT works closely with the Vietnamese operating purchasing
authority (VNPT) in the development of Internet technology policies, directives, and
regulations.
6. See Huw Watkin, Censors Slow Advance into Global Information Economy, S.
China Morn. Post. 1 (Feb. 21, 2001) (available in 2001 WL 2307507).
7. A firewall is:
a system designed to prevent unauthorized access to or from a private network.
Firewalls can be implemented in both hardware and software, or a combination of
both. Firewalls are frequently used to prevent unauthorized Internet users from
accessing private networks connected to the Internet, especially intranets. All
messages entering or leaving the intranet pass through the firewall, which examines each message and blocks those that do not meet the specified security criteria.
Webopedia.com, Firewall <www.pcwebopedia.coml TERM/f'firewall.html> (accessed Jan.
10, 2003).
8. See generally John T. Delacourt, Recent Development, The InternationalImpact of
Internet Regulation, 38 Harv. Intl. L.J. 207 (Winter 1997) (surveying attempts at Internet
regulation in the United States, Germany, and China); Steven M. Hanley, Comment, InternationalInternet Regulation:A MultinationalApproach, 16 John Marshall J. Computer &
Info. L. 997 (Summer 1998); Amy Knoll, Any Which Way But Loose: Nations Regulate the
Internet, 4 Tul. J. Intl. & Comp. Law. 275 (Summer 1996); John F. McGuire, Student Author, When Speech is HeardAround the World: Internet Content Regulation in the United
States and Germany, 74 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 750 (June 1999).
9. See generally Richard Cullen & Pinky D.W. Choi, The Internet in China, 13 Colum.
J. Asia L. 99 (Spring 1999); David S. Cooper, The Dot.Com(munist) Revolution: Will the
Internet Bring Democracy to China?, 18 UCLA P. Basin L.J. 98 (Fall 2000); John H. Taylor,
III, The Internet in China: Embarking on the "InformationSuperhighway" With One Hand
on the Wheel and the Other Hand on the Plug, 15 Dick. J. Intl. L. 621 (Spring 1997).
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Vietnam's legislative provisions that shelter a state centered regulatory
firewall, where emphasis is placed on both the Press Law and the Law on
Publishing. Part IV identifies the inevitable tension between Vietnam's
anti-trust legislation and the maintenance of the firewall. Part V sets
forth specific reasons why the Vietnamese government will no longer be
able to maintain its regulatory firewall. This Comment concludes that
Vietnam's anti-trust legislation, the Law on Competition, and subscription to the E-ASEAN Agreement, all of which in effect increase market
access to private companies, will bring an end to the government's regulatory "Bamboo Firewall." 10
II.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A.

SOCIALIST IDEALS

The Vietnamese government's development of regulatory policy governing the Internet is essentially the result of socialist assumptions regarding the role of the state in economic growth. Specifically, there is an
assumption that market-based growth must take place within a legal
framework that makes the state the preeminent economic actor. 1 ' According to the Index of Economic Freedom, 12 government controls on the
means of production and central planning in Vietnam constitute approximately sixty percent of GDP. 1 3 The same Index cites that state-owned
enterprises ("SOEs") account for forty to forty-five percent of industrial
output and absorb sixty to sixty-five percent of available credit. 14 As set
forth in the Constitution of Vietnam, power is given to the government to
provide a multi-component commodity economy functioning in accordance with market mechanisms under the management of the state and
15
following a socialist orientation.
10. "Bamboo Firewall" is a name derived from other journal articles citing China's regulatory policy over the Internet. See e.g. Scott E. Feir, Comment, Regulations Restricting
Internet Access: Attempted Repair of Rupture in China's Great Wall Restraining the Free
Exchange ofIdeas, 6 Pac. Rim L. & Policy J. 361 (1997); Kristin M. Reed, Comment, From
the Great Firewall of China to the Berlin Firewall: The Cost of Content Regulation of Internet Commerce, 11 Duke J. Comp. & Intl. L. 451 (2001).
11. See William E. Kovacic, Antitrust: Capitalism,Socialism, and Competition Policy
in Vietnam, Am.B. Assn. (Summer 1999).
12. The Index published by the Heritage Foundation provides a number of supporting
statistics regarding the role of the state as an economic actor <http://database.townhall
.com/heritage/index/country.dfm?ID=158>. Although the author acknowledges that the Index may not be a comprehensive measure of economic freedom, it does provide a useful
model for making relative judgments concerning the role of the state in economic policy.
See also Vietnam Economic Monitor, World Bank, Autumn 2001 15 <http://www.world
bank.org.vn/data-pub/reports/report002.htm#r31> (accessed Jan. 10, 2003).
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Socialist Republic of Vietnam Const. of 1992 ch. 2, art. 15.
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Given that the state is the primary impetus behind facilitating economic growth in Vietnam, regulation of the Internet through government policy is in complete harmony with long established socialist
principles. This is evident in Vietnam's first decree regarding Internet
usage issued in 1997, which clearly sets forth the role of the state in
Internet development:
[t]he Government will unanimously manage and control the Internet
and its service in Vietnam, oversee external gateways hooking up with
the Internet, and inspect information transmitted in this network. Any
offices, organizations, enterprises, wishing to link their computerized
information networks to Internet shall necessarily place the servers in
Vietnam, which shall be hooked up with defined external gateways; and
be responsible for all information transmitted and received (emphasis
added).16
C.

INTERNET MANAGEMENT STATUTES

Under the 1997 decree, three government departments manage the
Internet and implement legislation. As Article 2 states: "The Minister of
Science, Technology and Environment; the Minister of Culture and Information, and the General Director of the General Postal Bureau
("DGPT") shall be responsible to provide guidance on the implementation
7
of this decree."'
Especially noteworthy is that under the decree, the DGPT is explicitly delegated the exclusive authority and primary role in managing the
Internet. Chapter III, Article 15 of the decree provides that the role of
the agency is:
[tlo direct the construction of the back-bone information network (the
network's infrastructure); to oversee external gateways and security facilities; and to regulate modes of connection, linkage, and integration
for all computerized information networks in Vietnam, linked with Internet with an aim to centrally manage the entire volume of information routed through the national back-bone network.' 8
Following the enactment of the decree, the DGPT implemented various policies governing Internet usage and services. One of the DGPT's
initial actions consisted of appointing Vietnam Data Communications
("VDC") to operate as the country's sole Internet Access Provider ("LAP")
and licensing four other companies to operate as Internet Service Provid16. Vietnam Decree No. 21-CP, art. 1 (Mar. 5, 1997) <http://www.vietsotonline.com.vn/
english/policy/attach2l.asp>.

17. Id. at art. 2.
18. Id. at art. 15.
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ers ("ISPs"). 19 The five ISPs were structured to be state-owned agencies
20
that would lease access from the gateway.
The decree and other policies provided that any organization, office,
or business that is licensed to supply Internet services 2 1 must adhere to
a number of requirements. 22 First, ISPs are limited to only the Internet
services outlined in their licensing agreement. 23 Any change in operations or objectives must be approved by amendment. 24 Second, suppliers
are required to submit proposed prices to delegated state agencies for
approval before setting rates for public use. 2 5 Third, ISPs can only establish computer systems in Vietnam and are limited to access lines
through the single gateway or Internet Access Provider. 26 Additionally,
27
Internet service suppliers have to register all of their users.
Furthermore, any organization, business, or office desiring Internet
access is required to meet specified standards. The procedure for license
approval requires the applicant to state a definite purpose of use, insure
proper installation of a computer network, demonstrate adequate control
guarantees and have the presence of qualified technicians for Internet
28
services.
Any individual wishing to obtain Internet access is subject to the
following requirements: they must register with a state licensed and approved ISP, and sign subscription contracts that make them responsible
for information input into, transmitted to, and received from their
networks.29
The conclusion of the 1997 decree clearly states that the only condition necessary to invoke a legal obligation under these requirements is
the mere existence of a single connection to the Internet. Thus, any organization, business, or individual, using a computer linked to the Internet where information is transmitted or received, is also subject to the
19. Vietnam Ready for Internet Connection, Saigon Times 1 (Nov. 2, 1997) (available in
1997 WL 8991878) (noting that three of the original companies appointed as Internet Service Providers included Vietnam Post and Telecommunications Corp., Corporation for Financing and Promoting Technology, Saigon Postal and Informatics Technology Institute).
20. Id.
21. See U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Intl. Market Insight Rpts., Vietnam Internet Issues,
Asia Intelligence Wire (Apr. 4, 2000) (available in 2000 WL 7292596) (discussing that up
until recently, Vietnam was limited to a single IAP and five ISPs).
22. Vietnam: Plugging Into Internet Under Government Management, Saigon Times 1
(Apr. 20, 1997) (available in 1997 WL 8991091).
23. Vietnam Decree, supra n. 16, at art. 8.
24. Id. at art. 9.
25. Id. at art. 7; see also Vietnam, supra n. 22, at 1.
26. Vietnam Decree, supra n. 16, at art. 7; see also Vietnam, supra n. 22.
27. Vietnam Decree, supra n. 16, at arts. 5, 7; see also Vietnam, supra n. 22.
28. Id.
29. Vietnam Decree, supra n. 16, at art. 12.
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supervision of the state. 3 °
III.
A.

THE "BAMBOO FIREWALL"

REGULATORY LEGISLATION: THE SEEDS OF THE FIREWALL

As demonstrated above, the 1997 Decree makes every effort to hold
organizations, businesses, and individuals accountable for information
transmitted via the Internet. In particular, Chapter I, Article 3, of the
1997 Decree, states that:
"Information input into, transmitted to and received from the Internet via Vietnam-based external gateways shall be subject to provisions of Article 10 of the Press Law and Article 22 on the Law of
31
Publishing of Vietnam."
The Press Law, adopted on December 28, 1989, by the Sixth Session
of the Eighth National Assembly of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, is
the government's quintessential statute governing information. 3 2 Recently, the Vietnamese government has interpreted the Law to also govern telecommunication. 3 3 As applied to the Internet, the Press law
requires that information transmitted through the Internet must not:
- Incite the population to oppose the State of the Socialist Republic of
Vietnam, or undermine a national unity bloc.
- Incite acts of violence; advocate invasion wars, cause hatred among
nationalities and peoples, propagate reactionary ideology, and culture, pornography and criminal behavior, social evils, or sabotaging of
traditional values.
- Disclose secrets of Party and Government, military, security, economic, and foreign relations secrets, confidential information on private lives of citizens, and other kinds of secrets determined by law.
- Report false information, or information distorting history, negating
revolutionary achievements, insult national heroes; 34
libel the prestige
of organizations, or the honor or dignity of citizens.
30. Id.
31. Id. at art. 3.
32. Doan Viet Hoat, Monopoly of the Press in Vietnam Today <http://www.freemedia.
atlpfn vietnam.htm> (accessed Jan. 10, 2003). The Press Law is based on Article 4, Article
67, and Article 87 of the Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. The Press Law
determines all activities of the press from approval and appointment of publishers, editors,
and reporters, to all other management arrangements. Id. The government's Central
Committee on Thought and Cultural Affairs controls the content of the press by issuing
guidelines and directives to editors, and newsmen who are, in most cases, party members.
Id. The law was originally applicable to "things banned from information in the Press" but
has long since been used to regulate information transmitted over the Internet. Id.
33. See Vietnam, supra n. 22, at 1.
34. Law on the Press ch. III, art. 10 <http://www.vnnews. com/cociI0202/0202.htm>; see
also Saigon Times, supra n. 22.
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The second law that enforces regulatory oversight of the Internet is
Article 22 of the Law on Publishing. Adopted on July 7, 1993, in the
Third Conference of the Ninth National Assembly, the original intent of
the law was to protect the rights of creativeness and dissemination of
works. 3 5 Article 22 of the Law on Publishing reiterates the tenets of the
Press Law, but specifically states that any works with content in viola36
tion of the Article are prohibited from publication.
B.

THE

FIREWALL: FUNCTION AND EFFECTVENESS

Interpreted together, the Press Law and the Law on Publishing form
the legislative framework upon which the Vietnamese government has
established its regulatory firewall. The firewall serves several functions.
First, it serves a technological function by centralizing transmitted information that can be controlled or managed. 3 7 Second, it acts as a political
control mechanism or functions as an electronic filter by essentially
keeping Internet users from connecting to Web sites that the government considers politically, religiously, or sexually offensive. 38 Third, the
firewall allows the government to intercept e-mail. 3 9 Within the framework of the firewall, the Vietnamese government has installed software
that identifies key words in e-mail messages or headers. The e-mail is
then referred to a network administrator who may under their own discretion, decode encrypted messages and then either chose to censor or
40
delete objectionable content.
The firewall is extremely effective given the way in which the regulatory structure was designed. Since all Internet traffic must go through
the Vietnam's single gateway, the VDC, from a technical standpoint, the
government is able to easily monitor information that is traveling
through a single bandwidth. 4 1 As of August 2001, it was estimated that
the firewall already blocks well over 3,000 Web sites. 4 2 It is unclear,
however, whether this approximation is completely accurate. For instance, the estimation excludes the significant number of political and
religious sites that also get filtered out, not to mention proxy servers that
35. Law on Publication ch. III, Preamble <http://www.vnnews.com/occi/002/0201

.htm>.
36. Id. at ch. III, § I, art. 22; see also id. at ch. IV, arts. 32-37 (providing for state
administration of any publishing activities as a unified and centrally located process).
37. Mark McDonald, Asia Worries Firewalls Won't Screen out Offensive Material,
Knight-Ridder Trib. Bus. News 2 (Aug. 13, 2001) (available in 2001 WI 25951816).
38. Id. at $ 2.
39. Id. at $$1 23-24, 39.
40. Id.
41. See U.S. Dept. of Commerce, supra n. 21, at 1.
42. McDonald, supra n. 37, at $ 8.
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attempt to inundate the firewall. 4 3 Additionally, this number does not
take into account the objectionable Web sites originating in Vietnam.
For example, "there are countless anti-Hanoi political sites operating on
the Web" by refugees, emigrants, and domestic dissidents. 44 In fact, the
state controlled media in Vietnam has widely reported "that exiled
Vietnamese groups were increasing their efforts to slander Hanoi via the
Internet by exaggerating ethnic conflicts and fanning religious
tensions."45
The regulatory nature of the firewall has manifested itself in other
ways. For instance, the Vietnamese government has taken every effort
to supplement the regulatory effect of the firewall by raiding homes, disconnecting telephone lines, and confiscating computers. 46 ISPs fearful of
being held accountable for illegally transmitted information, have established censorship teams to prowl the Internet for objectionable sex, violence, and political danger. 4 7 Vietnamese security forces have also
increased the allocation of resources for controlling transmitted Internet
information by creating online identification, tracking, and observation
48
software.
C.

REGULATORY COSTS

Despite the appearance of effectiveness, the firewall imposed by the
Vietnamese government is not being enforced without significant economic, social, and political costs. The fact that there is only one gateway
used by all Internet customers in Vietnam demonstrates that the VDC
may only guarantee a limited range of speed and bandwidth. 49 This, in
effect, creates occurrences similar to the June 11, 2001, shutdown where
the usage exceeded the capability of the gateway. In addition, users incur costs in the form of narrow bandwidth access that is both time and
usage rate dependent. Another important factor is that users generally
have no other alternatives for Internet connections that provide quicker,
50
more reliable access.
As a result of this dependency, the DGPT is able to use the gateway
to impose some of the world's highest connection fees. 5 1 For example,
ISPs on average in Vietnam charged the equivalent of $1500 U.S. dollars
a month for a 65K leased line to the gateway whereas individual home
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id. at 9.
Id. at 15.
Watkin, supra n. 6, at 3.
McDonald, supra n. 37, at 20.
Id. at 24.
Watkin, supra n. 6, at IT 7-8.
Vietnam Internet Issues, supra n. 21, at 1.
Cohen, supra n. 3, at 1.
Id.
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users average approximately $1.24 an hour for Internet service. 52 These
high costs are extremely significant considering that the annual per capita income in Vietnam is approximately $370.00.53 The costs are also
distributed among domestic businesses in the form of high licensing fees
and user costs. As of 2000, only five hundred out of Vietnam's 600,000
local businesses had e-mail addresses. The most significant cost from
the regulatory firewall is the opportunity cost of foreign investment. In
fact, the Vietnamese government clearly recognizes that its "foreboding"
firewall drives off potential foreign investors while severely limiting do54
mestic entrepreneurs.
IV. DEFINITION OF THE PROBLEM
The current technological dilemma in Vietnam is two-fold. First, the
government needs a means by which to address the increasing Internet
and mobile phone servicing demands of the country. Second, the government faces the question of how to maintain Vietnam's regulatory firewall
over transmitted information in spite of the recent trend toward privatization of Internet services.
A.

MEETING INTERNET SERVICING NEEDS

As cited below, a number of statistics show that despite the enormous costs of Internet access, there is a sharp increase in the demand
and consumption of Internet services. For instance, the Vietnamese government has estimated that by 2005, at least 1.2 million people (1.5 per55
cent of the population) should be able to afford access to the Internet.
By 2010, the Government estimates that there will be approximately
twenty-three million Internet users.56
With the significant increase in the demand for Internet services,
both consumers and suppliers have argued for governmental reform. As
early as 1998, ISPs began to openly express discontent with the VDC's
role as the sole IAP. The state owned ISPs essentially argued that such
a structure represented "unfair competition." 57 Consumers have long
since expressed that the state-owned Internet monopoly is a source of
52. Id.
53. U.S. Dept. of State, BackgroundNote: Vietnam, 4 <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/bgn/
4130.htm> (accessed Jan. 10, 2003).
54. McDonald, supra n. 37, at 11.
55. Tu Hoang, Sharp Rise in Internet SubscriptionsForecast,Vietnam Inv. Rev.
1, 3
(June 4, 2001) (available in 2001 WL 12429689); see also James Borton, Vietnam Joins the
Internet Revolution, Asia Times,
19 (Feb. 22, 2002) (citing that DGPT aims to increase
Internet usage to 4-5 percent of the population by 2005).
56. Id.
57. Reduction in InternetAccess, Vietnam Econ. Times 6 (Sept. 1,1998) (available in
1998 WL 29277372).
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bandwidth delay, service congestion, and exorbitant usage fees.58
But the concerns expressed by domestic consumers and ISPs are in
actuality, a tenet of a much larger ongoing campaign for reform. For
instance, a major concern among state economists and market reformists
in Vietnam is,
[t]he widespread monopoly situation in most industries, the lack of a
level playing field for different economic sectors, and policy mechanisms
59
which do not encourage the entry of new competitors to the market.
Additionally, ever since Vietnam implemented the policy of Doi
Moi,60 there has been broad support for economic liberalization of markets.6 1 Vietnam has aligned itself with various international bodies
such as the Association of South East Asian Nations ("ASEAN") and the
Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation ("APEC"), both of which have had an
effect on Vietnam's domestic economic policy. 62 For example, on November 4, 2000, at an ASEAN Summit in Singapore, the Vietnamese government adopted the E-ASEAN agreement, promoting the cooperation
between member countries in establishing "Information and Communi63
cations Technology" ("ICT").
In August 2001, as a result of domestic pressure, the Vietnamese
government made affirmative efforts to evaluate the plausibility of implementing new antitrust laws, which would open the local Net access
market to competition between private Internet service providers. 6 4 On
September 7, 2001, the Vietnamese government implemented a new Internet Technology decree, allowing ISP businesses to participate with
foreign investment enterprises ("FIEs") and other private Internet com58. Id. at $$ 1-3; see also Giang, supra n. 2.
59. Vietnam: Competition and Anti-trust, Vietnam Econ. Times 1 (Feb. 1, 1999) (available in 1999 WL 9140984).
60. The literal translation of"Doi Moi" is a "new change." See Nguyen Van Khon, AnhViet Viet-Anh, Tu Dien (Dainam Publg. 1987). For a broader discussion of the economic
liberalization effects of "Doi Moi," Spencer Weber Waller & Lan Cao, Law Reform in Vietnam: The Uneven Legacy of Doi Moi, 29 N.Y.U. J. Intl. L. & Policy 555 (1997); Pamula L.
Polevoy, Privatizationin Vietnam: The Next Step in Vietnam's Economic TransitionFrom a
Nonmarket to a Market Economy, 23 Brook. J. Intl. L. 887 (1998).
61. See generally Mark Sidel, New Directionsin the Study of Vietnamese Law, 17 Mich.
J. Intl. Law 705 (1996) (discussing the content and origin of Doi Moi); see also Pham Van
Thuyet, Legal Frameworkand Private Sector Development in TransitionalEconomies: The
Case of Vietnam, 27 L. & Policy Intl. Bus. 541 (1996).
62. See Yoshi Kodama, Annual Review of Significant Developments: 1995 Asia-Pacific
Region, APEC and ASEAN, 30 Intl. Law. 367 (1996) (discussing Vietnam's involvement
with both international organizations).
63. See E-ASEAN Framework Agreement: Singapore <http://www.aseansec.org/summitt infs4_afw.htm> (Nov. 24, 2000) (accessed Jan. 10, 2003).
64. Adam Creed, Vietnam Government Readies New Internet Rules, Newsbytes News
Network $ 1-4 (Aug. 20, 2001) (available in 2001 WL 23417879).
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panies. 65 The decree also allowed other businesses to compete within
66
the IAP market, contingent upon the State holding a controlling stake.
B.

MAINTAINING VIETNAM's FIREWALL IN LIGHT OF LIBERALIZATION

The second technological dilemma facing the Vietnamese government is how to maintain Vietnam's regulatory firewall over transmitted
information given the recent trend toward privatization of Internet services. While Vietnamese leaders generally support the expansion of the
Internet service market, many are adamant in maintaining the integrity
of the firewall. Do Quy Doan, chairman of the Vietnam Web site Project
at the Ministry of Culture and Information, stated that the Vietnamese
authorities show no signs of tearing down their firewall. 6 7 This statement is indicative of Vietnam's efforts to insure the continued existence
of its regulatory approach to the Internet.
The intent of the Vietnamese government in maintaining control
over the firewall is also being manifested in various policy measures.
For instance, the government has launched a propaganda campaign to
educate and warn citizens about accessing inappropriate sites. 68 The intent of such campaigns is to make users aware of various content restrictions while providing a preventative tool to limit the number of potential
offenders. 6 9 The government has established stricter fines and penalties
for illegal use of the Internet. 70 These fines can be imposed for activities
ranging from minor offenses such as accessing prohibited sites to more
71
serious offenses such as computer hacking.
V.

ANALYSIS: WHY VIETNAM CAN NO LONGER MAINTAIN ITS
REGULATORY FIREWALL

As previously described, development of the means to address the
increasing Internet servicing needs of the country is incompatible with
the maintenance of the firewall over transmitted Internet information.
The two goals present conflicting and contradictory policy outcomes.
The tension between these two issues is reflected in Vietnam's legal
texts, demonstrating the current discord between socialism and mar65. See Government Throws Open Internet Door To All Economic Sectors, Vietnam
News 1 (Aug. 31, 2001) <http://vietnamnews.vnagency.com.vn/2001-8/30/Stories/19.htm>.
66. Id.
67. See McDonald, supra n. 37; see also Communist Vietnam May Fortify Internet Firewall, Lao Dong Newsp. (Aug. 16, 2002) (citing Phan An Sa, Deputy Chief Inspector of the
Culture and Information Ministry, intent to further strengthen Vietnam's firewall).
68. Communist Vietnam May Fortify Internet Firewall, supra n. 67, at 3.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
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kets.72 For instance, the Constitution of Vietnam sends a conflicting
message. On one hand, it states that the state sector shall play the leading role in the national economy. 73 On the other hand, it allows for private individuals and private capitalist sectors to "set up enterprises of
74
unrestricted scope in all fields of activity."
The threshold issue then becomes whether Vietnam's attempt to increase Internet servicing through privatization will undermine the regulatory effect of the country's firewall over the Internet. There are three
major reasons why Vietnam will not be able to maintain its regulatory
control over the firewall. First, Vietnam's recently implemented antitrust policies in the form of the Enterprise Law,7 5 the Law on Competition,76 and the Law on Competition and the Internet Technology Market 77 will significantly reduce the regulatory effectiveness of Vietnam's
state owned gateway. Second, increased privatization resulting from
these anti-trust measures will significantly strengthen the domestic
lobby7 8 among business owners and consumers in opposition to the firewall. Third, Vietnam's formal subscription to E-ASEAN 79 will lead to
greater international pressure for the government to open Internet markets and reduce regulatory barriers over telecommunication channels.
A.

VIETNAM'S ANTITRUST POLICY

The first reason why the Vietnamese government will not be able to
maintain its regulatory firewall over information transmitted via the Internet is due to its recent anti-trust policies that have been promulgated
in the form of various laws.
The notion of anti-trust is a relatively new concept among
Vietnamese political and economic policy makers. 80 Ever since Vietnam's extraordinary economic reforms beginning with Doi Moi coupled
72. See Kovacic, supra n. 11; see also Mark Sidel, Law Reform in Vietnam: The Complex Transition from Socialism and Soviet Models in Legal Scholarship and Training, 11
UCLA P. Basin L.J. 221 (1993) (discussing Vietnam's difficulties in achieving legal reform
in light of the country's transition toward market liberalization).
73. See Kovacic, supra n. 11.
74. Socialist Republic of Vietnam Const. of 1992, ch. II, art. 21 <http://www. cpv.
org.vnlvietnam-en/constitution/1992/chapter2.htm>.
75. See infra pt. V. A2.
76. See infra pt. V. Al.
77. See infra pt. V. A3.
78. See infra pt. V. B.
79. See infra pt. V. B.
80. See Kovacic, supra n. 11, at 1077-78; see also William E. Kovacic, Lessons of Competition Policy Reform in Transition Economies For U.S. Antitrust Policy, 74 St. John's L.
Rev. 361, n.9 (Spring 2000) (mentioning the work that Western antitrust institutions have
engaged in to help governments such as Vietnam understand and develop specific antitrust
legislation).
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with nearly a decade of significant growth, the government has considered the economy at somewhat of a standstill. As a result of this,
Vietnamese policy makers are seeking to identify the proper approach
to developing a competition policy system in emerging markets and determine how a competition regime would operate in a national that
8
mandates a preeminent role for the state as a market participant. '
In fact, it was not until October 2000, that the Ministry of Trade
actually began drafting an anti-trust law to regulate monopolies and
competition within Vietnam's emerging open market economy.8 2 In a series of seminars and legislative workshops, the Ministry of Trade attempted to heed the concerns of business leaders regarding the inability
of private companies in Vietnam to compete with state-owned enterprises. s 3 After much discussion, the net result of these negotiations between business leaders and the Ministry of Trade was a tentative draft,
84
entitled the Competition Law.
1. Development of Vietnam's Law on Competition
The anti-trust legislation attempts to address four key types of anticompetitive behavior. First, it takes preventative measures against collusion among producers to fix prices, output, and divisions of market
share. 8 5 Second, the legislation prohibits dominant firms from dumping
goods into the market or overcharging during the low point in the production cycle. 86 Third, it limits mergers and acquisitions that would cre87
ate monopolies or overly dominant companies in a particular sector.
And finally, the new laws eliminate anti-competitive activities such as
88
undercutting, misleading advertising, and illegal bribery.
To fully understand how business groups were able to effectively negotiate, lobby, and coordinate with the Vietnamese government in draft81. See Kovacic, supra n. 11, at 1075-76.
82. Nguyen Hong, Talks Delay Inking ofDraft Competition Law, Vietnam Inv. Rev.

1

(Oct. 2, 2000) (available in 2000 WL 9576638).
83. Id. at T12.
84. See generally Ngo Hong Hanh, Competition Law Draft Takes Monopolies to Task,
Vietnam Inv. Rev. (June 2001) (available in 2001 WL 12429728); Ngo Hong Hanh, Competition Law to Free Deserving Market Players, Vietnam Inv. Rev. (July 2001) (available in
2001 WL 12429870) (discussing the background of the legislative process involved in the
drafting of the Law on Competition); see also Kovacic, supra n. 11, at n. 6 (citing to other
publications on the development of the Law on Competition); Nguyen Binh, GeneralReport
on Competition Law in the Market Economy in Vietnam (Mar. 1997) (discussing existing
Vietnamese laws with competition policy implications and suggesting need for new initiatives in Vietnam pursuant to United Nations Development Program VIE/94/003).
85. See Nguyen Hong Competition Law Subject to Sectoral Exemptions, Vietnam Inv.
Rev. 1 (Nov. 13, 2000) (available in 2000 WL 9576977).
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
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ing this law, it is important to take a step back and to briefly note the
legislative policy that set the ground work for such actions, notably the
EnterpriseLaw.
2.

The EnterpriseLaw

As mentioned before, as a result of Vietnam's economic standstill in
the late 1990's, the government made an active attempt to boost the competitiveness of the country's domestic exports.8 9 This included an effort
by the government to cut red tape, license fees, and bureaucratic
supervision. 90
In addition, the law expedited specific procedures among individuals
applying for business licenses. As the Prime Minister, Phan Van Khai,
emphasized: "an important component of the [Enterprise] law is that it
removes specific legal franchise requirements for private enterprises,
making it easier for them to set up business."9 1
Thus, the extent to which domestic businesses were able to successfully negotiate anti-trust legislation with the Vietnamese government
was completely dependant upon the implementation of the Enterprise
Law. 92 A recent report by the World Bank found that the Enterprise
Law significantly simplified the business start-up process. 9 3 In addition,
the report estimated that approximately 10,000 additional domestic
firms had registered for business licenses in the first nine months after
the adoption of the Law. 94 The Vietnamese government also estimated
that the Law had resulted in the creation of approximately 100,000 new
95
jobs.
3.

The Law on Competition and the Internet Technology Market
The National Assembly is not expected to formally codify the Law on
89. See Ngo Quang Xuan, Vietnam: PotentialMarket and New Opportunities,19 Ford-

ham Intl. L.J. 32, pt. II.B. (Oct. 1995) (discussing Vietnam's policy objectives regarding
increased exports in the early 1990s).
90. See Bich Ngoc, EnterpriseLaw Hailedfor Boosting Trade and Jobs, Vietnam Inv.

Rev.

3 (Sept. 18, 2000) (available in 2000 WL 9576594).

91. Ha Thang, State to End Bias Against Private Firms, Vietnam Inv. Rev.

3 (May

10, 1999) (available in 1999 WL 16539165).
92. See Thai Thanh, EntrepreneurshipShould be Fostered, Saigon Times Mag. (Aug. 2,

2000) (interviewing Dr. Le Dang Doanh, Director of the Central Institute of Economic Research; discussing the relationship between established enterprises and the openness of
Vietnam's business laws).
93. Joint Report of World Bank, Asian Development Bank and LNDP, Consultative
Group Meeting for Vietnam, Vietnam 2010: Entering the 21st Century, Overview, Vietnam

Development Report 2001 9 (2001) <http://www.adb.org/documents/reports/Vietnam 2010/
overview.pdf>.
94. Id.

95. Ngoc, supra n. 90, at

1.

2002]

VIETNAM'S ANTITRUST LEGISLATION

Competition until 2003.96 Despite this, there is significant evidence that
the law already has had a profound effect on the Internet technology and
communications market. 9 7 When evaluating the future of the Internet
technology market in the context of the legislative purpose and intent of
the Law on Competition, a number of significant observations develop.
First, with the advent of the Enterprise Law and the prospective
Law on Competition, domestic Internet servicing companies find themselves in a much more favorable position to negotiate against the perils
of Internet market regulation.9" Since the Enterprise Law fundamentally eased the number of licensing requirements for business applications, business owners can also easily argue that the benefits of the law
should be extended to licenses within the Internet servicing market.9 9
Second, the current political climate is also conducive to consumer
activism in support of restructuring the Internet service market. This is
based on the notion that consumers have more information about services in Vietnam and understand the adverse effects of a monopoly 0 0
The fact that consumers of Internet services in Vietnam have been subjected to high fees, unreliable access, and excessive use requirements,
indicates that a large percentage of Internet users are highly dissatisfied
with the State's control over the Internet market. 1 1
Third, there is already evidence that the government has been
forced to adjust its economic policy regarding the Internet service market. This is demonstrated by Vietnam's recent decree opening the Internet market to competition between private ISPs. The government
also has recently allowed businesses to compete within the IAP market
as long as the State has a controlling stake. 10 2 Even the head of the
DGPT, Mai Liem Truc, has asserted that, "to promote the use of the Internet we need to improve the quality of IT services and reduce Internet
96. Hong supra n. 82, at
5; see also Sun-Hee Lee, Vietnam Competition Law and
Competitiveness, AsiaLine
7 (Dec. 23, 2002) <http://www.asialine.dfat.gov.au/asialine/
asialine.nsf> (citing that the final draft is to be discussed at April 2003 National
Assembly).
97. See Paulette Blanscet, Vietnam: Telecommunications Market Overview, Off. of
Telecomm., U.S. Dept. of Commerce, U.S. Intl. Trade Commn. (July 2000) (citing that due
to anticipated Competition Law, the build up of Vietnam's telecommunication network is
increasingly becoming one of the largest in the world despite being highly regulated).
98. Vietnam: Competition and Anti-Trust, supra n. 59, at 13.
99. See Ngo Hong Hanh, Competition Law to 'Free Deserving Market Players',Vietnam
Inv. Rev. 4 (July 23, 2001) (available in 2001 WL 12429870) (discussing how Vietnam's
competition laws are requiring regulators to consult interested market participants before
implementing policy).
100. See Vietnam: Competition and Anti-Trust, supra n. 59, at 13.
101. Cohen, supra n. 3, at 1 1-4.
102. See Government, supra n. 65.
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access fees."
From these observations, it is clear that the Law of Competition will
affect the Internet service market in some form. The degree to which the
Law will alter the market remains to be seen until it is officially implemented in 2005, but all indications tend to demonstrate a trend toward
privatization in the Internet market.1 0 4 The next question that needs to
be addressed is the manner in which privatization within the Internet
service market will constitute an end to Vietnam's regulatory firewall.
B.

PRIVATIZATION AND THE FIREWALL

The second reason why the Vietnamese government will not be able
to maintain its regulatory firewall over the Internet is due to the privatization of the telecommunication market. Historically, the ability of the
Vietnamese government to effectively monitor information transmitted
over the Internet is the result of operating a single gateway through
which all Internet traffic must travel. 10 5 Thus, since the gateway is administered through Vietnam Data Communications, which is owned by
the DGPT, the government has direct oversight over the single
bandwidth transmitting Internet information. 10 6 Essentially, the gateway provides a "bandwidth shared line"10 7 which means that customers
accessing the Internet either within or outside of Vietnam are forced to
transmit information through the gateway.
Given this arrangement, the government is able to distribute resources to the single bandwidth through the use of software, decoding
applications, e-mail interception, and censoring programs.1 08 The effectiveness of these technological monitoring tools is clearly dependent on
the quantity of information received and the various channels upon
which information is being transmitted. In theory, the convenience of a
single bandwidth enables the government to not only control the speed
and quantity of information, but also to focus regulatory resources to a
single channel of transmitted information. 10 9 Additionally, all five of Vi103. Internet Usage Tipped to Skyrocket, Vietnam News 1 (Sept. 10, 2001) <http:ll
vietnamnews.vnagency.com.vn/2001-08/30/Stories/24.htm>.
104. See Blanscet supra n. 97, at 1; see also Lee, supra n. 96, at [ 8, 11.
105. See supra n. 21.
106. See Watkin, supra n. 6, at
1.
107. A "shared bandwidth line" is defined as : (1) A range within a band of frequencies
or wavelengths, (2) The amount of data that can be transmitted in a fixed amount of time.
For digital devices, the bandwidth is usually expressed in bits per second(bps) or bytes per
second. For analog devices, the bandwidth is expressed in cycles per second, or Hertz (Hz)
<www.pcwebopedia. com/TERMb/bandwidth.html>.
108. Watkin, supra n. 6, at 11 1-2, 8, 12; see also Cohen, supra n. 3, at 1.
109. Vietnam Internet Issues, supra n. 21, at 1.
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etnam's original state controlled ISPs were only able to provide Internet
services based on access that originated through the gateway.
As mentioned in part, on September 7, 2001, the Vietnamese government issued a decree allowing for the participation of private entities in
the ISP market and in the IAP market, contingent on the State owning a
controlling stake."10
The privatization of Internet services as demonstrated by this recent
decree, hampers Vietnam's policy goal to maintain the integrity of the
regulatory firewall in a variety of ways. First, by allowing private companies and foreign investment enterprises (FIEs) to provide Internet services, the expectation is that the cost of service will significantly
decrease."' As private ISPs compete with state-controlled ISPs, the
price of Internet access will no longer be set at a state regulated price,
rather it will be based on the demand of consumers. The government, to
some extent, has given credence to this foreseeable outcome. For instance, the government has estimated that by 2003, as many as ten new
ISPs are expected to utilize these new regulations."i 2 Additionally, the
expectation is that when the consumer price of Internet service decreases, the demand for such servicing will naturally increase."l 3 Increased demand for Internet services subverts the effectiveness of
Vietnam's firewall in that the quantity of information transmitted over
1 14
the Internet will also exponentially increase.
Unless Vietnam is able to distribute more resources to the firewall
in response to the increased information flow resulting from consumer
demand, it is highly unlikely that effective monitoring can take place.
There are many who have substantiated this claim by referring to the
structural failure of Vietnam's firewall at current demand levels."15 Do
Quy Doan, Chairman of the Vietnam Web site Project at the Ministry of
Culture, has openly expressed that control through the firewall is no
longer effective."i 6 As consumer demand for Internet services increases,
it appears that the government is more interested in making investments in the infrastructure of the gateway to improve the quality of access than in reinforcing the firewall.
Additionally, rather than strengthening the technical infrastructure
of the firewall, the government seems to be more adamant about impos110. Creed, supra n. 64, at 1; see also supra n. 65.
111. See The View From Here, Vietnam Inv. Rev., Jul. 2001, at 2 (discussing the domestic price effects from privatization and the reduction in state owned enterprises).
112. See Creed, supra n. 64; see also Government, supra n. 65.
113. See Government, supra n. 65.
114. Blanscet, supra n. 97, at 2 (discussing the increase of information flow in Vietnam's
telecommunications market).
115. McDonald, supra n. 37, at 3.
116. Id.
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ing high fines and penalties as a new source of deterring subscribers
from accessing adverse Internet content. 117 Such penalties are also assigned to ISPs that fail to provide adequate regulatory safeguards and do
11 8
not meet a set standard of quality service.
Second, opening the IAP market to other businesses, even if the
State holds a controlling stake, eliminates the convenience of regulating
a single bandwidth. An example of this is the VDC's recent business cooperation contract ("BCC") with Hong Kong Telecommunications, Ltd.
The contract allows Hong Kong Telecommunications to provide many of
Vietnam's ISPs with a higher bandwidth area. 1 19 Cooperative contract
arrangements such as this inevitably subvert the firewall where there
are new incoming lines that provide Internet access without having to go
through the gateway.
Third, as privatization increases the demand for Internet services,
the regulatory costs of regulating the firewall can be expected to increase. 120 As already stated, if the purpose of the firewall is to ensure
that politically, religiously, or sexually offensive material is inaccessible, 1 2 ' then sufficient resources must be in place to oversee the increased
availability and use of the Internet. These resources include sophisticated filtering software, high capacity servers, and a wide network to
identify incoming or outgoing transmissions, all of which are extremely
costly.12 2 This does not include the immense human capital in the form
of technical expertise, system engineers, and network analysts that have
to maintain the structural architecture of the firewall. 123 The Ministry
of Culture and Information will also need to employ more inspectors and
trained censors to insure compliance.
Fourth, in the long run, privatization will personify the opportunity
costs of imposing a firewall in the form of lost foreign investment. 12 4 In
an attempt to minimize the loss of foreign and domestic investment in
the Internet service market, the government has adopted a firewall free
117. Adam Creed, Vietnam Government Readies New Internet Rules, Newsbytes News
Network IT 1, 7-11 (Aug. 30, 2001) (available in 2001 WL 23417879).

118. Id. at

11.

1, 9
119. David Tran, Hong Kong Telecom Steps into InternetMarket with VDC, NEA
<http://www.nikkeibp.com/nea/ju198/napjuly/nam.html>.
120. Reed, supran. 10, at pt. II (discussing the significant costs to Chinese government
from Internet regulation).
121. See McDonald, supra n. 37.
122. See Reed, supra n. 10.
123. Id.
124. Minimizing opportunity costs is consistent with Vietnam's efforts to foster foreign
investment through economic reform. See Norman Brown IV., The Long Road to Reform:
An Analysis for Foreign Investment Reform in Vietnam, 25 B.C. Intl. & Comp. L. Rev. 97
(2002); see also Luke Aloysius Mcgrath, Vietnam's Struggle to Balance Sovereignty, Centralization, and Foreign Investment Under Doi Moi, 18 Fordham Intl. L.J. 2095 (1995).
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business zone. 12 5 It is still questionable whether or not this zone will
sufficiently offset the loss of investment from businesses deterred by Vietnam's regulatory scheme.
Fifth, Vietnam's Law on Competition will provide a body of litigation
that will undermine the value of the regulatory firewall. For instance,
anti-trust laws will provide both foreign and domestic investors with a
legal tool to fight government protectionism. 12 6 The Law on Competition
will be viewed as a remedy to adequately address concerns regarding corruption, red tape, lackluster law, and lack of transparency in the
Vietnamese legal system. 127 Where regulatory requirements such as the
registration of users or adequate safeguards to insure the transmission
of appropriate content are imposed on ISPs, firms to some extent may
argue that such requirements limit their competitive advantage and act
as a bureaucratic tool hindering efficiency. Anti-trust laws in Vietnam
could reasonably be used by private ISPs as a wedge against Internet
128
regulation in the name of competition.
Among consumers, anti-trust laws will encompass a new source of
social justice. 129 Consumers will become more apt to state claims allowing for consumer choice in the Internet market. They will also be
more able through anti-trust laws to litigate against "unfair practices
such as predatory and discriminatory pricing by maintaining competitive
markets."130 In essence, consumer liberalization through privatization
may translate into broader civil rights claims. Arguably, the right to life,
healthcare, education, and employment are associated with economic
prosperity to some degree. This is demonstrated by the contribution of
anti-trust laws in the United States, where such laws emphasize "human
13 1
liberty and benefiting the consumer's economic position."
The anti-trust laws in Vietnam will also form a specialized body of
case law, a dispute system, and a resolution process. This is evident
from Vietnam's recent penalties against ISPs to adequately provide content safeguards or maintain a certain set level of quality services. Anti125. McDonald, supra n. 37, at %12.
126. See Hiep D. Truong, EncouragingForeign Direct Investment in Vietnam: Economic
Reform, ProtectionAgainst Expropriation,and InternationalArbitration,8 J. Transnatl. L.
& Policy 347, 353 (1999) (discussing the various legal remedies and mechanisms Vietnam
has adopted to facilitate foreign investment).
127. Id.
128. See Dror Ben-Asher, What's the Connection? Vietnam, The Rule of Law, Human
Rights, and Antitrust, 21 Hous. J. Intl. L. 427, 434-435 (1999) (discussing the general effects of anti-trust policy in Vietnam on business and consumers).
129. See id. at 439-41 (discussing the relationship of Vietnam's anti-trust laws and development of human rights).
130. Id. at 439-40.
131. Id. at 441.
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trust laws may act as a "safe harbor" for ISPs hoping to alleviate the
effects of these content requirements.
C.

E-ASEAN

The third indicator that the Vietnamese government will not be able
to maintain its regulatory firewall over information transmitted via the
Internet stems from its obligations under E-ASEAN. This is supported
by the fact that both domestic pressures, such as privatization, and in13 2
ternational pressures hinder the effectiveness of Vietnam's firewall.
1.

Brief overview of ASEAN

1 33

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations ("ASEAN") was established on August 8, 1967, in Bangkok, Thailand by five original mem34
It
bers: Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand.'
13 5
organization.
the
joined
Vietnam
that
1995,
28,
July
was not until
The ASEAN declaration sets forth two main objectives of the organization: (1) to accelerate the economic growth, social progress and cultural
136
development in the region through joint endeavors and partnerships;
and (2) to promote regional peace and stability by adherence to the principals of the UN charter. 13 7 Since its original founding, ASEAN has
been active in enacting various political accords, agreements, and cooperative partnerships ranging from issues such as transnational crime to
138
energy policy.
2.

1
Legislative Intent of E-ASEAN

39

On November 24, 2000, Vietnam, as well as the other members of
ASEAN entered into an agreement regarding Information and Communications Technology ("ICT"), which was later titled as E-ASEAN.140 Article 2 sets forth the basic objectives of the Agreement consisting of:
132. See generally Dawn Tan Ly-Ru, Singapore and InternationalLaw: July-December
2000, 4 Sing. J. Intl. & Comp. L. 530 (discussing changes in Singapore domestic ITC policy
as a result of E-ASEAN).
133. See generally Sherry M. Stephenson, ASEAN and the MultilateralTrading System,
25 L. & Policy Intl. Bus. 439 (Winter 1994).
134. Association of Southeast Asian Nations: An Overview, Establishmentand Membership 2 <http://www.aseansec.org/147.htm> (accessed Jan. 10, 2003).
135. Id.
136. Id. at 4.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 9.
139. See E-ASEAN Task Force 8 <http://www.e-aseantf.org> (accessed Jan.10, 2003)
(providing additional resources regarding the background, formation, purpose, and projects
associated with E-ASEAN).
140. See E-ASEAN Framework Agreement: Singapore,24 November 2000 <http://www.
aseansec.org/910.htm> (accessed Jan. 10, 2003).
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promoting cooperation to enhance the competitiveness of the ICT sector
in ASEAN, reducing the digital divide between ASEAN member states,
promoting cooperation between public and private sectors, and promoting the liberalization of trade in ICT products and services. 14 1
It is important to address the various reasons why fulfilling their
obligations under E-ASEAN is of utmost concern to the Vietnamese government. In the past decade, Vietnam has attempted to integrate itself
with the emerging Asian-Pacific regional bloc. This has involved aligning itself with other nations by becoming members of regional blocs such
as ASEAN and APEC. 1 4 2 Furthermore, Vietnam has been active in
143
forming trade alliances with countries such as the United States.
Some have speculated that Vietnam's attempt to integrate itself within
the international economic sphere centers on future plans to join the
World Trade Organization ("WTO") 14 4 or obtain most favored nation
1 45
trade status.
Vietnam's signing of the E-ASEAN agreement is an outward manifestation of the country's current efforts toward economic integration. In
addition, it is the government's recognition of the vital role e-commerce
plays in the region and the importance for Vietnam to participate in this
trend. 14 6 The government also realizes its precarious position in relationship to Internet technology. A recent report by an ASEAN working
group ranked Vietnam's information technology as the fourth lowest
141. Id. at art. 2.
142. APEC, Why APEC Matters to Americans <http://www.apec.org> (accessed Jan. 10,
2003). The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum was established in 1989 to
promote economic integration around the Pacific Rim and to sustain economic growth. Id.
APEC currently has twenty one members: Australia; Brunei Darussalam; Canada; Chile;
People's Republic of China; Hong Kong, China; Indonesia; Japan; Republic of Korea; Malaysia; Mexico; New Zealand; Papua New Guinea; Peru; Republic of the Philippines; Russia; Singapore; Chinese Taipei; Thailand; USA; Vietnam. Id.; see also Martin Runder,
Institutional Approaches to Regional Trade and Cooperation in the Asia Pacific Area, 4
Transnatl. L. & Contemporary Problems 159, 167-78 (Spring 1994) (discussing the role of
APEC).
143. See U.S. Embassy, Hanoi, Vietnam, Bilateral Trade Agreement, in effect from December 10, 2001 <http://usembassy.state.gov/vietnam/wwwhtiss.html> (accessed Jan. 10,
2003). The United States recently entered into a renewed bilateral trade agreement with
Vietnam, which took effect on December 10, 2001. Id.; see also Yen D. Chu, The Making of
a Quagmire: The Inadequacies of Applying the Jackson-Vanik Amendment to Vietnam's
TransitionalEconomy, 5 Colum. J. Transnatl. L. 453 (1997) (discussing Vietnam's recent
trade relationships with the U.S.).
144. See Fredrick Burke, Vietnam's WTO Accession Negotiations <http://www.itis-online.com. sg/doc Vietnam'sWTOAccession.pdf> (accessed Jan. 10, 2003).
145. See Davis Frye, Vietnam's Contemporary Battle with the United States: Vying for
Most Favored Nation Trading Status, Vand. J. Transnatl. L. 777 (Oct. 1996).
146. Tu Giang, Board Chief Sheds Light on National E-Commerce Plan, Vietnam Inv.
Rev. 1 1 (July 30, 2001) (available in 2001 WL 12429947).
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compared to all ten of the member countries. 14 7 The report also stated
that there were only nine PCs for every 1000 people, and that just 0.0 13
percent of the total population had access to the Internet. 148 Vietnam's
telecommunications fees and Internet access charges were also cited as
the highest in the region. 149 The Government also recognizes the limited
availability of financial resources to improve its Internet infrastructure.
As Tran Cong Due, an officer within the Ministry of Science, Technology,
and Environment, stated: "the severe lack of capital is barring us from
materializing the dream of prosperity brought about by information
150
technology."
Given these facts, the Vietnamese government views E-ASEAN as a
way to develop regional partnerships to alleviate its struggling technological crisis. 15 1 In particular, E-ASEAN is perceived as a means to obtain financial and technical resources that the country otherwise could
not access. 152 For instance, in January 2002, Vietnam implemented a
program within the E-ASEAN Agreement, called the "E-Trade Bridge" to
help incorporate new technologies into trading practices. 153
3.

E-ASEAN and the Firewall

Vietnam's adoption of E-ASEAN undermines all policy efforts to
maintain the regulatory firewall. First, Article 4, Clause lof the EASEAN agreement conflicts with any long run policy of maintaining the
firewall through the use of a single IAP. 1 54 Article 4, Clause 1, states
that members shall design their domestic information infrastructure to
facilitate interconnectivity and ensure technical inter-operability between other member information infrastructures. 15 5 In theory, for Vietnam to meet this requirement, the country will have to substantially
change its gateway design. The presence of a single bandwidth, which
basically supports the primary structure of the firewall, severely limits
both interconnectivity and inter-operability. 1 56 Additionally, it has been
147. Tu Giang, Asian IT Poll Ranks Country as Seventh Best, Vietnam Inv. Rev. T% 1-3
(Feb. 19, 2001) (available in 2001 WL 12429059).
148. Id. at 1 11.
149. Id.
150. Tu Giang, It is Still the Case: Main Information Technology Projects Lacking Cash,
Vietnam Inv. Rev.
4 (Sept. 24, 2001) (available in 2001 WL 12430260).
151. Dao Yen, Can Vietnam Hatch the E-Commerce Golden Egg? <http://www. internetnews.com/ec-news/article/0,,4_869671,00.html> (accessed Jan. 10, 2003).
152. Id.
153. U.N. Development Programme, E-trade Plan to Back Dot.corn Entrepreneurs in
Viet Nam, Media Release <http://www.undp.org.vn/undp/unews/mr/2002/eng/0124e.htm>
(accessed Jan. 10, 2003).
154. E-ASEAN, supra n. 140, at art. 4.
155. Id.
156. Cohen, supra n. 3, at 1; see also Watkin, supra n. 6, at 2.
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demonstrated that Vietnam's use of a single TAP is not sufficient to meet
current demand. 15 7 With this in mind, it is unlikely that a country with
a single IAP is in any position to fully comply with the legislative expectations set forth by this Clause.
Second, Article 4 also mandates that Vietnam shift its distribution
of resources from regulatory Internet monitoring to improving domestic
technological infrastructure. 158 As Clause 2 states, "member states shall
work toward establishing high speed direct connection between their national information infrastructures with a view to evolving this interconnection into an ASEAN Information Infrastructure backbone."' 5 9 The
language in this clause is significant because it essentially urges Vietnam to depart from its current use of a single bandwidth structure. As
stated earlier, the time delay, congestion, and unreliability of Vietnam's
current Internet is due to its singular bandwidth. Thus, Clause 2 sets
forth that the emphasis is not on Internet regulatory policy, but on estabthat Vietnam's current Inlishing high-speed connections, something
160
ternet structure does not provide.
Third, the E-ASEAN agreement attempts to facilitate regional content exchanges. As stated in Article 4, Clause 3, "member States shall
work towards developing ASEAN content, relating but not limited to, cooperation in digital libraries and tourism portals." 16 1 Content exchange
is a very controversial issue among advocates of the firewall in Vietnam.
It not only increases the type of information accessible over the Internet,
but it also provides large databases that some government leaders view
as a potential threat to national security. 16 2 Tourism portals also pose a
significant risk in that they undermine the stronghold of the gateway.
Such portals provide an alternative route in which information may be
accessed or transmitted. Thus, any attempt by Vietnam to regulate content may be easily thwarted through alternative means, especially, the
type of exchange that is envisioned by the E-ASEAN Agreement.
Fourth, the ASEAN Agreement places an emphasis on regional,
rather than national gateways. Article 4, Clause 4, states: "Member
States shall work towards facilitating the setting up of national and regional Internet exchanges and Internet Gateways, including regional
caching and mirroring." 16 3 The last part of this clause indicates the em1-2.
157. Giang, supra n. 2, at
158. E-ASEAN, supra n. 140, at art. 4.
159. Id.
160. Blanscet, supra n. 97, at 1 (discussing that Vietnam's current firewall has reduced
Internet speeds up to 300 percent).
161. E-ASEAN, supra n. 140, at art. 4.
162. Vietnam: Plugginginto Internet Under Government Management, Saigon Times IT
10, 14 (April 20, 1997) (available in 1997 WL 8991091).
163. See E-ASEAN, supra n. 140, at art. 4.
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phasis that
the Agreement places on regional gateways. For instance,
"caching" 164 is essentially the temporary storage of information transmitted over the Internet. "Mirroring"16 5 is creating a duplicate set of Internet content (i.e. information accessed through one gateway may be
identically accessed through a completely separate gateway). The last
part of Clause 4 creates an Internet structure where, for example, information accessed through Thailand's gateway, may be reciprocally, accessed through Vietnam's gateway. 1 66 Again, this type of structure
constitutes a major threat to Vietnam's ability to preserve its regulatory
firewall.
Fifth, E-ASEAN liberalizes ICT services. As articulated in previous
sections, privatization poses a significant threat to the continuing viability of Vietnam's firewall. 167 Just as domestic pressure in the form of
anti-trust law further pushes Vietnam's Internet servicing market toward privatization, E-ASEAN will produce a similar effect. Article 6
clearly outlines a variety of member obligations in respect to the liberalization of trade, products, services, and investment in ICT. 168 Clause 4,
specifically states that members shall, "open immediately [their] ICT
products to investments by ASEAN investors." 16 9 Again, the
Vietnamese government is placed in an awkward position. The government must weigh the risks associated with alienating ASEAN investors
with those of imposing regulatory mandates to enforce the firewall.
Overall, E-ASEAN sets forth member obligations that are completely contrary to the Vietnamese government's maintenance of its firewall. In fact, Vietnam's subscription to E-ASEAN is the variable that
will largely shape the government's Internet technology policy.1 7 0 Member obligations in the form of interconnectivity, information sharing, and
regional networks will ultimately bring about the complete demise of Vietnam's regulatory firewall. Thus, there is a high likelihood that Viet164. Webopedia.com, Cache <http://www.webopedia.comI/TERM/c/cache.html> (accessed
Jan. 10, 2003) (referring to a special high-speed storage mechanism). It can be either a
reserved section of main memory or an independent high-speed storage device. Two types
of caching are commonly used in personal computers: memory caching and disk caching.
Id.
165. Webopedia.com, Mirror Site <www.webopedia.com/TERMlMlmirrorsite.html>
(accessed Jan. 10, 2003) (referring to the creation of a Web site that is a replica of an
already existing site, used to reduce network traffic (hits on a server) or improve the availability of the original site). Mirror sites are useful when the original site generates too much
traffic for a single server to support.
166. E-ASEAN, supra n. 140, at art. 4.
167. See supra Part V.B.
168. E-ASEAN, supra n. 140, at art. 6.
169. Id.
170. See U.N. Development Programme, supra n. 153. This is becoming more evident as
Vietnam implements measures such as "E-Trade" which are more consistent with EASEAN policy goals rather than those in support of maintaining the firewall. Id.

20021

VIETNAM'S ANTITRUST LEGISLATION

nam will not be able to maintain its firewall given the policy obligations
imposed on the government by E-ASEAN.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The Vietnamese government is at a pivotal time in its involvement
in the Internet servicing market. The government faces a number of
critical decisions regarding domestic anti-trust policy, the enforcement of
Internet regulatory statutes and long-run integration into the international economic sphere.
Whatever approach the government takes to enforce its control over
Internet content will inevitably involve significant costs. If the policy
choice is to enforce the firewall by maintaining content, upholding access
restrictions, and strengthening the use of a single gateway, the government incurs the costs of limited Internet access speed, capability, and
usage. This in turn, will further upset the balance among domestic businesses and customers. Furthermore, the government risks alienating
foreign investors interested in domestic Internet servicing. The
Vietnamese government could possibly expect to disappoint member
states by not fulfilling their commitment under the E-ASEAN
agreement.
Conversely, if the Vietnamese government chooses to fully comply
with the Law on Competition, and completely open the market up to Internet servicing without tedious licensing requirements, content restrictions, and liability for transmitted information, the government will face
other costs. Privatization of the Internet market will naturally increase
the number of Internet users, IAPs, ISPs, and other private entities. As
asserted earlier, the growth of participants in the market will increase
the costs of regulation, oversight, and human capital.
An interesting inquiry is whether or not there is any middle ground.
According to some scholars, non-regulation is the answer to the regulatory question involving the Internet. 171 The premise is based on the following: first, that it is better to allow the Internet to develop and evolve
before making any attempt to impose intervening policy; 1 7 2 and second,
that only after the growth of the Internet has peaked, can regulatory law
have any profound effect on content. 17 3 Although in practice non-regulation appears to be an attractive solution, it seems to be economically unrealistic. With the increasing use of the Internet for transactional
purposes involving commerce, including such activities as e-banking, epurchasing, and e-reservations, it is highly unlikely that Vietnam, or any
171. Shamoil Shipchandler, The Wild Wild Web: Non-Regulation as the Answer to the
Regulatory Question, 33 Cornell Intl. L.J. 435, 458 (2000).
172. Id.
173. Id.
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other country for that matter, will adopt a complete non-regulatory
approach.
The recent events in Vietnam demonstrate that at the least, the government is more open to allowing private participation within the Internet market. But even with the government's increasing affiliation
with privatization, the complete demise of Vietnam's regulatory firewall
may not be apparent for quite some time. Since the Vietnamese government has taken a gradualist approach to privatization, the effects of both
the anti-trust laws and expansionist policies affecting the firewall may
not manifest themselves immediately. Vietnam's strict fines and penalties over Internet activities may continue to artificially uphold the firewall. Also, until the anti-trust laws are fully applied and until a
significant amount of case law results, it is unclear what remedies consumers or business owners may assert against the government for maintenance. What is clear however, is that the government's anti-trust
laws, privatization, and subscription of E-ASEAN all have the potential
to bring an inevitable end to Vietnam's "bamboo firewall."
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